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TAXATION 
JosEPH CuRTis* 
Tax cases and legislation produced several changes in the law of some 
importance and general interest. There was the usual multitude of clarifying 
and minor substantive changes in the tax legislation of the 1958 Regular 
Session. However, the following comments are directed only to those enact-
ments of more general concem.1 
LEGISLATION 
A. Income Tax 
The 1958 amendment undoubtedly affecting the greatest number of tax-
payers is that which eliminates the election to pay the income tax in in-
stallments.2 Probably most Virginians are now well aware that begin-
45. If, for example, two counties desire to establish a recreation area according to the 
example given in the text, may they proceed under the cooperation act rather than the 
Park Authorities Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-714.1 -714.11 (Repl. Vol. 1956), and so 
create their own legal entity? Presumably, such an entity could not issue bonds. But 
what contractual authority may it have? May it sue and be sued? If it is subject to suit, 
would an entity created jointly by a city and county share the county's immunity in a 
personal injury action, or would it be liable as a city, or would a direct action lie against 
the city as a joint tortfeasor? 
46. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 5-24 (Repl. Vol. 1956), § 5-24.1 (Supp. 1958) (joint airport 
operation). 
• Professor of Law, William and Mary. Member, Virginia and New York bars. B.S., 
1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M., 1948, New York University. 
I. No attempt is made here to treat revisions and innovations of relatively limited 
interest, such as license, public service, and motor fuel tax amendments. 
2. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-117 (Supp. 1958). 
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ning with the 1958 income tax, due in 1959, a penalty will be incurred 
unless the entire tax is paid on or before the due date of the return.3 
Second in scope, perhaps, is the amendment excluding from gross income 
interest on obligations of a political subdivision of the state.4 Formerly, 
the interest exclusion was applicable only to federal and Virginia obligations. 
The amended provision now conforms to the federal income tax exclusion 
which also exempts obligations of state political subdivisions. 
Other income tax enactments of significance permit public school teachers 
to deduct expenses incurred for summer college work to improve their 
professional qualifications or standing,5 and deny deductibility of contribu-
tions to persons supporting litigation in which they have no direct interest.6 
The summer school expense deduction authority apparently goes further 
than the much publicized Hill v. Conmzissioner,7 where the Fourth Circuit 
upheld a federal tax deduction for such expenses incurred to maintain 
current status. 
B. Corporate Entrance Fee 
Code section 58-448, providing that a foreign corporation had no right 
to transact business in Virginia until it had paid its entrance fee and had 
been issued a certificate, was repealed.8 Repeal does not, of course, eliminate 
the tax or affect the procedure for its collection, but it may possibly be 
construed to eliminate the payment of the tax as a condition precedent to 
conducting operations of any character within the state. 
C. Tangible Personal Property Tax 
In tax years beginning after 1958, household goods and personal effects in-
cidental to maintaining an abode may be exempted by the local governing 
body.9 With the exception of automobiles, business equipment, and property 
held solely for investment, the tangible personal property tax thus becomes 
wholly optional with the local governing body. 
3. The penalty is five per cent of the unpaid ta.x unless it was assessed by the Com-
missioner upon a return illed in good faith and without fault. This is in addition to in-
terest of one-half of one per cent monthly, irrespective of good faith and no fault. 
4. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58'-78(b) (5) (Supp. 1958). 
5. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 58-81(r) (Supp.1958). 
6. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-84.1 (Supp. 1958). 
7. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950). 
8. Va. Acts 1958, c. 562. 
9. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-829.1 (Supp. 1958). In addition to the comprehensive descrip-
tion, "All other tangible personal property used by an individual or a family or house-
hold incident to maintaining an abode," the section enumerates seven classes of items, 
including luxuries, which might adorn the home or the person. 
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D. Erroneous Assessments 
Pursuant to section 58-1141, application may be made to the local com-
missioner of revenue for correction of an erroneous assessment of local license 
ta."es and local levies on tangible personalty, merchants' capital, and (if it 
was the commissioner's error) realty, within five years following the year 
of assessment. While this section remains substantially unchanged, a new 
provision has been inserted into section 58-1142 limiting the refunds of a 
paid tax to a period of two years following the year of assessment, or to three 
years "since" the assessment if, under new section 58-1152.1, the local govern-
ing body has provided by ordinance for refund procedure. These periods 
apply only to refunds and not to exoneration from unpaid erroneous assess-
ments, and apparently have no application where, under section 58-1145, 
within one year following the assessment year relief is sought in the courts 
rather than with the local commissioner. 
JumciAL DECISIONs 
A. Privilege Tax on Business of Selling 
Virginia ceded exclusive jurisdiction of the Washington National Airport 
to the United States, reserving the right to levy a ta." on the sale of motor 
fuels for use in over-the-road vehicles.10 The state retail merchants license 
tax,11 and Arlington County's business privilege license ta.,.,12 both measured 
by the amount of sales, were assessed against a seller of oil and gasoline at 
the airport as being within the reservation, in addition to the state tax of 
six cents per gallon on all gasoline sold for motor vehicle use. Conceding 
that the six cents per gallon tax was proper, the seller sought relief from 
the license taxes. Holding in Floyd v. Fischer13 that the business privilege 
tax and retail merchants tax were not taxes on the sale of motor fuels, even 
though measured thereby, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the 
circuit court, which had dismissed the petition, and granted relief. The 
Court, speaking through Justice Whittle, said the intention to reserve the 
right to assess privilege taxes, which it termed regulatory measures, was not 
spelled out in plain language, and that substantial doubts whether tax legis-
lation includes within its scope certain subject matter must be resolved in 
favor of the ta."Payer. 
The Court did not specifically refer to the distinction between the sub-
ject and measure of a ta.,., so frequently made since Flint v. Stone Tracy CoY• 
10. VA. CODE ANN.§ 7-9 (1950). 
11. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 58-320 to -335 (1950). 
12. Arlington County Business Privilege Ta.-,: Ordinance, art. 67. 
13. 199 Va. 363, 99 S.E.2d 612 (1957). 
14. 220 U.S. 107 (1911). In this case, the 1909 federal ta.\: on corporations, measured by 
net income, was held not to be a then forbidden income taX. 
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This distinction has more often served to sustain a tax, which would other-
wise have been invalid if held to be upon the subject of commerce itself, 
rather than upon commerce as only the measure of the amount of tax liability. 
However, these propositions have by no means only a one-way application 
for the convenience of the taxing jurisdiction. The distinction between 
subject and measure clearly underlies the result reached here, and its ap-
plication to invalidate an indirect tax, which would have been sustained 
had it been imposed directly, has some support.l5 
B. Apportioned Gross Receipts of Interstate Business 
Virginia now levies a "franchise" tax upon express companies doing 
business in the state, measured by the gross receipts derived from the 
transportation within the state of express transported through, into, or 
out of the state.16 The former statutory provisions imposing this tax termed 
it an annual license tax for the privilege of doing business in the state, stating 
that it was in addition to the usual property taxes. In 1953 the Supreme 
Court of Appeals sustained the constitutionality of the old tax as applied 
to the Railway Express Agency, a Delaware corporation doing only inter-
state business in Virginia.l7 The Court found that the tax was essentially 
an intangible property tax on good will or going concern value, and, there-
fore, not invalid as a state tax on the privilege of doing interstate business. 
However, five members of the United States Supreme Court agreed that 
the practical effect of the tax conformed more to the statutory description 
of a business privilege tax than to the Virginia Court's classification, and 
held the tax invalid.lS Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, in-
dulged in some mathematics to find that as an intangible property tax, 
using the prescribed Virginia rate of 50 cents per $100, the intangible 
assemblage value of the Railway Express' tangible property exceeded more 
than 100 times its cost. This might not overtax the express company, but 
did overtax the Court's credulity.19 Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Justices 
Black, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren, were prepared to accept the 
Virginia Court's classification. 
15. See McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (sales tax measured by 
selling price invalid although use tax using same measure would have been proper). 
16. VA. ConE ANN. § 58-547 (Supp. 1958). 
17. Railway &'Press Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 757, 75 S.E.2d 61 (1953). 
18. 347 u.s. 359 (1954). 
19. Apparently Mr. Justice Jackson's mathematics were directed at examining the re-
lation between the subject and measure of the ta.x. The lack of such relation has some-
times proved fatal to a state tax on a separable local aspect of an interstate activity, 
where the measure used was found to reach more than was fairly allocable to the local 
incident. See Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); McCarroll v. 
Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176 (1940). 
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In 1956 the Virginia legislature revised the Code sections taxing express 
companies so as to term the tax a franchise ta.....:, removing the unpalatable 
(as applied to wholly interstate business) language "for the privilege of 
doing business," and providing specifically that the ta....: was in lieu of other 
taxes on intangibles and rolling stock.20 The 1956 tax assessment against 
Railway Express was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeals in Railway 
Express Agency, Inc. v. CommonwealthP the Court once more finding 
that the tax was on the separate and otherwise untaxed value of the property's 
assemblage as a going business. The language impediment to validity 
seemingly well overcome, the mathematics may take on less significance.22 
C. Assessment of Unique Property 
The problem of evaluating properties which are adaptable only for special 
uses is a most difficult one for assessors, particularly where, as in Virginia, 
the criterion of "fair market value" is set forth by the constitution.23 Unique 
properties rarely have a determinable market, and ascertaining how much 
the property would sell for under normal selling conditions is largely guess-
work, more or less depending upon the size of the class of potential buyers 
who could make use of it. In Tuckahoe Woman's Club v. City of Richmond24 
the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a lower court order and set aside 
an assessment of $105,000 based upon depreciated reproduction cost, as 
excessive in relation to the property's fair market value. The property was 
subject to a restrictive covenant that it could be used only as a woman's 
club, and furthermore, its rooms were suitable only for club use. Taking 
the view that there was no general market for such property, the assessor 
had considered the depreciated reproduction cost as the best evidence of 
the value of the property to the present owners. Justice Buchanan's opinion 
acknowledged that depreciated reproduction cost is a factor which may 
well be considered, but only as it might affect the market value, and not 
as the sole measure for ascertaining value to a particular owner. 
Perhaps underlying this result was a finding that the property was not 
so unique that it did not have a market, and therefore, the price for which 
it would be likely to sell, as agreed by all the witnesses,25 was conclusive 
20. VA. CooE ANN. §§ 58-546, -547 (Supp. 1958). 
21. 199 Va. 589, 100 S.E.2d 785 (1957). 
22. The United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction, 356 U.S. 929 
(1958). Of the five forming the majority in the 1954 decision, Justices Reed, Jackson, and 
Minton have left the Court. 
23. VA. CoNsr. art. XIU, § 169. 
24. 199 Va. 734, 101 S.E.2d 571 (1958). 
25. An expert for the taxpayer-plaintiff admitted that there was no fair market value 
for clubs, lodges, churches, or things of that nature, that they do not enjoy a market like 
other types of property, and that when asked for their fair market value, " 'you more or 
less pull it out of the air.' " !d. at 736, 101 S.E.2d at 572. 
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of the assessed valuation. It would certainly be more comforting, at least 
to the taxing authorities, to regard the result in that light rather than to 
suppose that the Court would so favor the test of what others might pay 
for property, regardless of its marketability, as to uphold a contention 
whereby a taxpayer would pay less tax on property with a building on it 
than if the land were unimproved.2s 
D. Dissolved Corporation Resurrected 
The Federal Housing Administration had insured mortgages of the 
mortgagor Virginia corporations. Subsequently it acquired title to the 
mortgaged properties upon surrender by the mortgagors to the mortgagee, 
and in tum, by the mortgagee to FHA. The mortgagor corporations were 
then dissolved, distributing their assets in liquidation to their two non-
resident stockholders, and certificates of dissolution were issued by the 
State Corporation Commission. Twelve years later, the FHA realized an 
excess of $255,000 from the management or sale of the properties. Pursuant 
to the National Housing Act, prior to its 1948 amendment, such excess was 
required to be paid to the mortgagors.27 In 1956 a receiver was appointed 
for the mortgagor corporations and the $255,000 was paid to him. Upon 
the State Tax Commissioner's assessment of income taxes arising out of 
the $255,000, the receiver filed a petition alleging that the taxes were 
erroneously assessed because the Commissioner was without authority to 
assess corporations which had dissolved and distributed their assets twelve 
years earlier. 
In Ashburn v. Commonwealth28 the Supreme Court of Appeals, affirming 
the dismissal of the petition by the lower court, found that the corporations 
were resurrected under the provisions of former Code section 13-73, and 
that Code section 58-128 gives the Tax Commissioner authority to impose 
the income tax upon every domestic corporation, whether dissolved, con-
tinuing, or resurrected.29 While title 13 of the Code was repealed and re-
placed by title 13.1, effective January 1, 1957, the same result might con-
26. Cf. People ex rel. New York Stock Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 App. Div. 193, 
223 N.Y. Supp. 64 (1st Dep't 1927), aff'd mem., 24'8 N.Y. 533, 162 N.E. 514 (1928). In 
this case, the New York Stock E.'l:change unsuccessfully contended that its Wall Street 
building, costing more than $4,000,000 to reproduce, should escape taxation because no 
one else could make any use of the building whatsoever. 
27. 52 Stat. 19 (1938). 
28. 199 Va. 747, 102 S.E.2d 28'1 (1958). 
29. No reference is made in the decision on this point to § 58-129, which deals specifi-
cally with the assessment and collection of income taxes of dissolved corporations, perhaps 
because it was thought irrelevant in view of the "resurrection"; also, the term "such 
taxable year" used in the section may be construed to apply only to the taxable year of 
dissolution. 
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ceivably be reached today by coupling with section 58-128 present section 
13.1-94(f), which gives any court with general equity jurisdiction full 
power to liquidate the remaining assets and business of a dissolved corpora-
tion upon application of any person for good cause.30 
30. Section 13.1-101, survival of remedy after dissolution, would seem to be confined 
to liabilities incurred prior to dissolution, and of course the tax liability here in issue 
does not arise until the receipt of the funds, twelve years thereafter. 
